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Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms∗
Yaonan Jin† Pinyan Lu‡ Zhihao Gavin Tang§ Tao Xiao¶
We consider a fundamental problem in microeconomics: selling a single item to a number of
potential buyers, whose values are drawn from known independent and regular (not necessar-
ily identical) distributions. There are four widely-used and widely-studied mechanisms in the
literature: Myerson Auction (OPT), Sequential Posted-Pricing (SPM), Second-Price Auction with
Anonymous Reserve (AR), and Anonymous Pricing (AP).
OPT is revenue-optimal but complicated, which also experiences several issues in practice
such as fairness; AP is the simplest mechanism, but also generates the lowest revenue among
these four mechanisms; SPM and AR are of intermediate complexity and revenue. We explore
revenue gaps among these mechanisms, each of which is defined as the largest ratio between
revenues from a pair of mechanisms. We establish two tight bounds and one improved bound:
1. SPM vs. AP: this ratio studies the power of discrimination in pricing schemes. We obtain
the tight ratio of C∗ ≈ 2.62, closing the gap between
[
e
e−1 , e
]
left before.
2. AR vs. AP: this ratio measures the relative power of auction scheme vs. pricing scheme,
when no discrimination is allowed. We attain the tight ratio of pi
2
6 ≈ 1.64, closing the
previously known bounds
[
e
e−1 , e
]
.
3. OPT vs. AR: this ratio quantifies the power of discrimination in auction schemes, and is
previously known to be somewhere between
[
2, e
]
. The lower-bound of 2 was conjectured
to be tight by Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) and Alaei et al. (2015). We acquire a
better lower-bound of 2.15, and thus disprove this conjecture.
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1
1 Introduction
How to maximize the expected revenue of a seller, who wants to sell an indivisible item to a
number of buyers, is a central problem in microeconomics. The simplest mechanism is Anony-
mous Pricing (denoted by AP). Such a mechanism simply posts a price of p ∈ R≥0 to all buyers,
and the item is sold out iff at least one buyer has a value no less than this price. If the seller
knows the value distributions of the buyers, he can leverage a proper price to maximize the rev-
enue (among this family of mechanisms). Although widely-used, this is not the revenue-optimal
selling method; the optimal mechanism is the prominentMyerson Auction (denoted by OPT; see
Myerson, 1981). In comparison, OPT is far more complex than AP, due to two reasons:
(a) It discriminates different buyers with different value distributions. Conceivably, this may
incur some fairness issues, and is not feasible in some markets.
(b) It is an auction scheme instead of a pricing scheme, and thus requires more seller-to-buyer
communication. This may also raise privacy concerns to the buyers, since they need to
report their private values, rather than make take-it-or-leave-it decisions.
These complications and other undesirable issues hinder the prevalence of Myerson Auction. To
address these issues, two mechanisms with intermediate complexities (compared to OPT and
AP) are widely studied in the literature, and are widely adopted in practice: (a) to avoid price
discrimination, the seller can use Second-Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve (denoted by AR;
see Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009); and (b) to reduce communication, the seller can employ
Sequential Posted-Pricing (denoted by SPM; see Chawla et al., 2010, 2015). We defer the formal
definitions of all mechanisms to Section 2.2.
These four mechanisms together form the lattice structure in Figure 1, in terms of both
revenue-domination and complexity. It is well known that there is a revenue gap between any
pair of mechanisms. The reader may query that how large these gaps can be.
Indeed, quantitative analysis of these gaps is also a striking theme in algorithmic economics.
To this end, the notion of approximation ratio (originated from the TCS community) turns out
to be a powerful language. There is a rich literature on studying revenue gaps/approximation
ratios among various mechanisms (e.g. see Bulow and Klemperer, 1994; Goldberg et al., 2001;
Bar-Yossef et al., 2002; Guruswami et al., 2005; Koutsoupias and Pierrakos, 2013; Chen et al.,
2014, 2015; Fu et al., 2015; Du¨tting et al., 2016; Alaei et al., 2019; Correa et al., 2017).
OPT: discriminate auction
SPM: discriminate pricing AR: anonymous auction
AP: anonymous pricing
[
1.34, 1.49
]
[2, e]
[2.15, e]
[2.23, e] [2.62, e]
2.62[
e
e−1 , e
] pi2/6 [
e
e−1 , e
]
Figure 1: Revenue gaps among basic mechanisms in the asymmetric regular setting. Our new
results are marked in bold: the C∗ ≈ 2.62 bound is by solving the SPM vs. AP problem (see
Section 3); the pi2/6 ≈ 1.64 bound is by solving the AR vs. AP problem (see Section 4); and the
2.15 bound is by constructing a better lower-bound instance for the OPT vs. AR problem (see
Section 5). For the other previously known results, we give a survey in Section 6.
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1.1 Our Results
In the natural setting with asymmetric1 and regular distributions, no tight revenue gap between
any pair of the four mechanisms was previously known. In this work, we get two tight bounds
and an improved bound, where the improved lower bound between OPT and AR disproves a
conjecture asked by Hartline and Roughgarden (2009); Hartline (2013); Alaei et al. (2019).
SPM vs. AP. This comparison measures the power of discrimination in pricing schemes. We
establish the tight ratio of constant C∗ ≈ 2.62. Prior to this work, the tight ratios in the
other three settings were known to be (a) n in the asymmetric general setting (see Alaei et al.,
2019); (b) e
e−1 ≈ 1.58 in the i.i.d. regular setting; and (c) 2 in the i.i.d. general setting (e.g.
see Hartline, 2013; Du¨tting et al., 2016).2 Actually, we can also get the last two ratios by com-
bining the results in Myerson (1981); Krengel and Sucheston (1978); Hill et al. (1982), which
was first observed by Hajiaghayi et al. (2007).
AR vs. AP. This comparison studies the relative power between auction schemes and pricing
schemes, when no discrimination is allowed. We first (a) prove an upper bound of pi
2
6 ≈ 1.64 in
the asymmetric general setting, and then (b) respectively construct matching lower-bound in-
stances in the asymmetric regular setting and the i.i.d. general setting. Prior to this work, (c) in
the i.i.d. regular setting, where AR is identical to OPT, an upper-bound of e
e−1 ≈ 1.58 was
obtained by Chawla et al. (2010), and afterward was shown to be tight by Hartline (2013).
OPT vs. AR. This comparison studies the power of discrimination in auction schemes. Previ-
ously, the tight ratios were known in all settings (see Myerson, 1981; Hartline, 2013; Alaei et al.,
2019) except for the asymmetric regular setting. Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) first tackled
the problem in this setting: they (a) proved an upper-bound of 4 (later improved to e ≈ 2.72
by Alaei et al., 2019), and (b) provided a 2-approximation lower-bound instance. Although this
lower bound of 2 has never been broken (for a decade), and is widely believed to be the tight
ratio, we will demonstrate a sharper 2.15-approximation instance in Section 5.
Interestingly, (a) the instance of Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) consists of two buyers;
yet (b) the two sharper instances in this work respectively involve three and four buyers. Given
this and other observations (see Section 5), we conjecture that the tight ratio is reached by an
instance with infinite number of buyers.
Extensions. The above three results also improve other related bounds by implication. For
example, due to Alaei et al. (2019), the tight ratio of the OPT vs. AP problem is somewhere
between [2.23, e]. This interval now shrinks to [C∗, e], by taking into account our tight result of
C∗ ≈ 2.62 for the SPM vs. AP problem.
We settle both of the SPM vs. AP problem and the AR vs. AP problem by formulating a rev-
enue gap as the objective function of a mathematical program. This methodology was initiated
by Chen et al. (2014) and Alaei et al. (2019). Employing a similar approach, Birmpas et al.
(2017) recently obtained a tight price of anarchy for multi-unit auction. Our work further sup-
ports the power of this framework in proving tight bounds. En route, we develop an abundance
of tools to handle these mathematical programs, which may find extra applications in the future.
For many revenue gaps well understood in the literature (e.g. see Bulow and Klemperer,
1994; Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009; Chawla et al., 2010; Kleinberg and Weinberg, 2012),
a corresponding worst-case instance consists of merely two or several buyers. By contrast, any
worst-case instance of our tight results includes infinitely many buyers; the ideas behind these
instances may be advantageous to lower-bound analysis of other related problems.
1Throughout the paper, asymmetric distributions refer to the setting when different buyers can have distinct value
distributions, as opposed to identical distributions.
2The referenced book and paper do not state their results explicitly in the language of SPM vs. AP. However,
these SPM vs. AP results are easy corollaries of the referenced results.
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1.2 Subsequent Work
In a conference version of this paper (Jin et al., 2019b), it is conjectured that the revenue gap
between OPT and AP equals C∗ ≈ 2.62, due to the following two observations.
(a) From our lower-bound instance (i.e. Example 1) of the SPM vs. AP problem, OPT does
extract the same revenue as SPM (see Lemma 1 and Remark 1).
(b) AP admits the same revenue gap against either OPT or SPM, in each of the asymmetric
general, i.i.d. general, and i.i.d. regular settings (see Tables 2 and 3).
This conjecture is confirmed by Jin et al. (2019a). Together with the tight revenue gaps devel-
oped in this paper, this result suggests the following economic interpretations. To extract more
revenue, using price discrimination may be more powerful than conducting anonymous-reserve
type auctions – not only because “SPM vs. AP” has a greater revenue gap than “AR vs. AP”, but
also because for the worst-case instance of “OPT v.s. AP”, the optimal Myerson Auction can be
implemented as an SPM mechanism.
1.3 Further Related Work
This work fits in the “simple versus optimal” paradigm proposed by Hartline and Roughgarden
(2009). For a full survey on current progress and future direction in this research agenda, the
reader can refer to the book “Mechanism Design and Approximation” by Hartline (2013).
Alaei et al. (2019) developed the mathematical-program-based approach in this context,
aiming to tackle the OPT vs. AP problem. However, because it is hard to directly quantify the
OPT revenue, the authors instead considered an upper-bound revenue formula called Ex-Ante
Relaxation3 (see Chawla et al., 2010). They formulated the Ex-Ante Relaxation vs. AP problem
as a simplified mathematical program, and the resulting tight ratio of e ≈ 2.72 gives an upper
bound of the original OPT vs. AP problem.
Sequential Posted-Pricing. In the literature, researchers also studied the revenue gap between
OPT and SPM. This comparison admits the same ratio for general distributions as for regular
distributions, due to a standard technique called ironing (see Myerson, 1981). In the i.i.d.
setting, Correa et al. (2017) established the tight ratio of 4 α ≈ 1.34. Notably, the corresponding
worst-case instance consists of infinitely many buyers. In the asymmetric setting, Chawla et al.
(2010) first got an upper bound of e
e−1 ≈ 1.58; Yan (2011) and Ehsani et al. (2018) showed
that this bound holds in broader settings. Recently, better upper bounds were acquired in
Azar et al. (2018); Beyhaghi et al. (2018); Correa et al. (2019a), and the state-of-the-art result
is constant5 β ≈ 1.50. On the other hand, the best known lower bound is actually the tight ratio
of α ≈ 1.34 in i.i.d. settings. For more details about this comparison, the reader can refer to
(Correa et al., 2019a, Section 1).
Prophet Inequalities. Hajiaghayi et al. (2007) first observed connections between the OPT
vs. SPM problem and the notion of prophet inequality (e.g. see Krengel and Sucheston, 1977,
1978) in stopping theory. Due to the numerous applications of those inequalities to algorithm
design and mechanism design, the last decade has seen extensive progress on them (e.g. see also
Babaioff et al., 2007; Kleinberg and Weinberg, 2012; Rubinstein, 2016; Rubinstein and Singla,
2017; Abolhassani et al., 2017; Esfandiari et al., 2017; Ehsani et al., 2018; Duetting et al., 2017;
3
Ex-Ante Relaxation is in spirit a “fake” mechanism, yet is useful to analyze approximation guarantees of simple
mechanisms. To introduce this technique, Chawla et al. (2010) actually employed the ideas involved in SPM. Later,
this technique was further developed in Yan (2011); Alaei (2014); Chawla and Miller (2016).
4 More precisely, constant α ≈ 1.34 is the unique solution to equation
∫ 1
0
(
x− x · ln x− 1 + 1/α
)−1
· dx = 1.
5 More precisely, constant β =
(
28
27
−
1
e
)−1
≈ 1.49.
4
Correa et al., 2019b; Du¨tting and Kesselheim, 2019; Anari et al., 2019). For more literature, the
reader can refer to the survey by Lucier (2017) and the references therein.
Multi-Item Mechanism Design. In multi-item environments, optimal mechanisms might be
more complicated and weird, and there is a rich literature on studying how well simple mech-
anisms approximate the optima. We can categorize previous work based on valuation functions6
of the buyers: (a) in unit-demand settings, see Chawla et al. (2007, 2010, 2015); Cai and Daskalakis
(2015); Kleinberg and Weinberg (2012); Cai et al. (2016); (b) in additive settings, see Hart and Nisan
(2012); Li and Yao (2013); Babaioff et al. (2014); Yao (2015); Cai et al. (2016); Eden et al.
(2017) (c) in constraint additive or submodular settings, see Chawla and Miller (2016); Cai and Zhao
(2017); and (d) in XOS or subadditive settings, see Feldman et al. (2015); Rubinstein and Weinberg
(2015); Anshelevich and Sekar (2017); Cai and Zhao (2017).
Beyond Independent Distributions. All the above mentioned works assume that there is no
correlation among buyers’ value distributions. Without this assumption: (a) Myerson Auction
is not the optimal single-item mechanism (e.g. see Cremer and McLean, 1988; Dobzinski et al.,
2015; Papadimitriou and Pierrakos, 2015); (b) to provide good revenue guarantees, simple
mechanisms (e.g. k-look-ahead auction, see Ronen, 2001; Chen et al., 2011) come to the rescue
once again.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
Notations. Denote by R≥0 (resp. N≥1) the set of non-negative real numbers (resp. positive
integers). Given two positive integers n andm, where n ≥ m, denote by [n] the set {1, 2, · · · , n},
and by [m : n] the set {m,m+1, · · · , n}. Function (·)+ maps any real number z ∈ R tomax{0, z}.
2.1 Distribution Families
We always focus on the single-item Bayesian mechanism design environment, where n buyers
independently draw values b = {bi}
n
i=1 ∈ R
n
≥0 from publicly known distributions F = {Fi}
n
i=1.
Most of our results are established under the standard regularity assumption on distributions
{Fi}
n
i=1. Besides, the family of triangular distributions will be useful for our lower-bound anal-
ysis. We introduce both concepts below, and then elaborate on the mechanisms to be studied.
Regular Distribution and Revenue-Quantile Curve. For any CDF F and the corresponding
PDF f : (a) the virtual value function is defined as ϕ(p)
def
= p− 1−F (p)
f(p) ; and (b) the revenue-quantile
curve is defined as r(q)
def
= q · F−1(1 − q). By definition, distribution F is regular (i.e. F ∈ REG)
iff virtual value function ϕ is non-decreasing, or equivalently, and iff revenue-quantile curve r is
a concave function. We interchange these two definitions whenever either is more convenient
for our use.
Triangular Distributions. This family of distributions was introduced by Alaei et al. (2019),
named based on the shapes of their revenue-quantile curves (as Figure 2 shows). With parame-
ters vi ∈ R≥0 (i.e. the monopoly price) and qi ∈ [0, 1] (i.e. the monopoly quantile), a triangular
distribution TRI(vi, qi) has a CDF of Fi(p) =
(1−qi)·p
(1−qi)·p+viqi for any p ∈ [0, vi), and Fi(p) = 1 for
any p ∈ [vi,∞).
Particularly, when N → ∞, distribution TRI(N, 1
N
) has a limitation CDF of F (p) = p
p+1 , for
all p ∈ R≥0. Denote this special limitation distribution by TRI(∞), which actually is involved in
the worst-case instance of the SPM vs. AP problem (see Section 3), as well as in the improved
lower-bound instances of the OPT vs. AR problem (see Section 5).
6There is a hierarchy: unit-demand & additive ( constraint additive & submodular ( XOS ( subadditive.
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ri(q)
q
1qi
viqi
0
(a) Revenue-quantile curve
Fi(p)
p
vi
1
0
1− qi
(b) CDF curve
Figure 2: Demonstration for triangular distribution TRI(vi, qi).
2.2 Mechanisms
Anonymous Pricing (AP). The seller posts a price of p ∈ R≥0 to all buyers; the item is sold
out iff at least one buyer values the item no less than this price. For brevity, (a) we denote by
AP(p,F)
def
= p ·
(
1−
∏n
i=1 Fi(p)
)
the resulting revenue, and (b) by AP(F)
def
= maxp∈R≥0
{
AP(p,F)
}
the best revenue among all choices of posted price p ∈ R≥0. If there is no ambiguity from
the context, we would drop the term {Fi}
n
i=1. The same convention applies to the next three
mechanisms as well.
Sequential Posted-Pricing (SPM). Such a mechanism is defined by prices p = {pi}
n
i=1 ∈ R
n
≥0
and a permutation σ ∈ Π: [n] → [n] over buyers. That is, the seller sequentially posts price
pσ−1(i) to each i-th coming buyer; the first coming buyer with value bσ−1(i) ≥ pσ−1(i) wins
the item. (a) We denote by SPM(σ,p,F) the resulting revenue. Respecting a specific order
σ ∈ Π, (b) let SPM(σ,F)
def
= maxp∈Rn
≥0
{
SPM(σ,p,F)
}
be the revenue from the optimal pricing
strategy. (c) We assume that the seller can choose the prices and the order, which leads to a
revenue of SPM(F)
def
= maxσ∈Π
{
SPM(σ,F)
}
.
Second-Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve (AR). The seller sets a reserve price of p ∈
R≥0 to all buyers, and there are three possible outcomes: (a) if no buyer has value bi ≥ p,
then the auction would be aborted; (b) if exactly one buyer has value bi ≥ p, then the item
would be sold to him at price p; (c) otherwise, the item would be sold to the highest buyer
i∗ def= argmaxi∈[n]
{
bi
}
at the second highest valuemaxi 6=i∗
{
bi
}
, i.e. the well-known Second-Price
Auction.
Let AR(p,F) be the expected revenue from the above scenario, and then define the optimum
(among all choices of reserve price p ∈ R≥0) as AR(F)
def
= maxp∈R≥0
{
AR(p,F)
}
. We postpone
the explicit revenue formulas to Section 4. However, it is easy to see that AR(p,F) ≥ AP(p,F)
for all p ∈ R≥0, and thus AR(F) ≥ AP(F).
Myerson Auction (OPT). Recall virtual value function ϕ(p) = p − 1−F (p)
f(p) . Myerson Auction
runs as follows: upon receiving values b = {bi}
n
i=1 from the buyers, the seller allocates the
item to the buyer with highest virtual valuemaxi∈[n]
{
ϕi(bi)
}
(required to be non-negative), and
charges this buyer a threshold/minimum price for him to keep winning.
The next structural lemma (proved in Appendix B) will be useful for settling the SPM vs.
AP problem, and for constructing improved lower-bound instances of the OPT vs. AR problem.
The subsequent remark explains the intuition behind this lemma.
Lemma 1. For any triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn, it follows that:
1. OPT = SPM =
∑n
i=1 viqi ·
∏i−1
j=1(1− qj).
6
2. An optimal SPM lets the buyers come in lexicographic order, and posts price pi = vi to each
buyer i ∈ [n].
Remark 1. Any triangular distribution TRI(vi, qi) is supported on interval p ∈ [0, vi], and only
the maximum possible value of bi = vi corresponds to a non-negative virtual value.
Thus, the Sequential Posted-Pricing proposed in Part 2 of Lemma 1 is equivalent to Myerson
Auction: (a) the seller first sorts all buyers in the decreasing order of {vi}
n
i=1; and then (b) lets
each buyer i ∈ [n] sequentially make a take-it-or-leave-it decision at the posted price of pi = vi;
thus, (c) this Sequential Posted-Pricing extracts the maximum possible virtual welfare.
3 Sequential Posted-Pricing vs. Anonymous Pricing
We first study the revenue gap between SPM and AP, in the setting with (possibly) asymmetric
and regular distributions F = {Fi}
n
i=1 ∈ REG
n. We interpret this question as the next mathe-
matical program, and safely drop constraint (C1) on interval p ∈ [0, 1] as it trivially holds.
max
F∈REGn
SPM = max
σ∈Π,p∈Rn
≥0
{
SPM(σ,p)
}
(P1)
subject to: AP(p) = p ·
(
1−
∏n
i=1 Fi(p)
)
≤ 1, ∀p ∈ (1,∞) (C1)
By getting the optimal solution to this mathematical program, we derive the next theorem.
In particular, Appendix C.1 includes the numeric calculations for the constant C∗ ≈ 2.6202.
Theorem 1. In asymmetric regular setting, the supremum ratio of SPM to AP is equal to
C∗ def= 2 +
∫ ∞
1
(
1− e−Q(x)
)
· dx ≈ 2.6202,
where function Q(p)
def
= − ln(1− p−2)− 12 ·
∑∞
k=1 k
−2 · p−2k.
Proof Overview. The upper-bound part of Theorem 1 is verified in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Our
proof follows the framework developed by Alaei et al. (2019), who derived the tight ratio be-
tween Anonymous Pricing and another benchmark called Ex-Ante Relaxation. Since the counter-
part program in that work also involves constraint (C1), towards characterizing the worst-case
instance of Program (P1) we reuse several reductions of Alaei et al. That is, we show that these
reductions also work when the objective function is replaced by the SPM revenue.
In Section 3.1 (Reduction Part), we first demonstrate that worst-case distributions of Pro-
gram (P1) w.l.o.g. fall into the family of triangular distributions. As a result, the complicated
objective function of Program (P1) can be replaced by another explicit formula (recall Part 1
of Lemma 1, namely the SPM revenue formula for triangular instance). Afterwards, based on
several other reductions, we show that a worst-case instance w.l.o.g. includes two special dis-
tributions TRI(∞) and TRI(1, 1), each of which contributes one unit to the SPM revenue. This
explains the term of 2 for the constant C∗ ≈ 2.6202.
In Section 3.2 (Optimization Part), we measure the SPM revenue derived from the remain-
ing distributions. Indeed, we can replace these distributions by a spectrum of “small” triangular
distributions, under which the SPM revenue increases or remains the same. The SPM revenue
from these “small” distributions corresponds to the integral term for constant C∗ ≈ 2.6202.
Notably, Alaei et al. (2019) did not introduce the special distribution TRI(1, 1), i.e. a deter-
ministic value of 1, in solving their counterpart program. For this reason, they constructed the
spectrum of “small” triangular distributions in a more complicated way. Here is our interpre-
tation of TRI(1, 1): this distribution never violates the feasibility as constraint (C1) is restricted
on the open interval (1,∞), but ensures one unit of the SPM revenue even if all other buyers
refute their take-it-or-leave-it offers. Although the ideas behind TRI(1, 1) seem to be intuitive,
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introducing it not only simplifies our proof, but also paves the way for the follow-up work of
Jin et al. (2019a) that settles the Myerson Auction vs. Anonymous Pricing problem.
In Section 3.3, we provide a matching lower-bound instance. The high-level idea is simple:
use finitely many “small” triangular distributions {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 to surrogate the worst-case
instance derived in the upper-bound proof. While being feasible to Program (P1), this instance
generates an SPM revenue arbitrarily close to the constant C∗ ≈ 2.6202, when the population
n ∈ N≥1 is sufficiently large.
3.1 Upper-Bound Analysis I: Reduction
We first show a reduction from a regular instance to another triangular instance, which is very
similar to the one by Alaei et al. (2019, Lemma 4.1). Under this, the SPM revenue increases or
keeps the same, whereas for any posted price p ∈ R≥0 the AP(p) revenue decreases.
Lemma 2. Given any regular instance {Fi}
n
i=1, there exists a triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
satisfying the following:
1. SPM
(
{TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
)
≥ SPM
(
{Fi}
n
i=1
)
.
2. AP
(
p, {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
)
≤ AP
(
p, {Fi}
n
i=1
)
for all p ∈ R≥0.
Proof. Given any optimal SPM mechanism for regular instance {Fi}
n
i=1, denote by σ
∗ ∈ Π the
buyer order and {p∗i }
n
i=1 ∈ R
n
≥0 the posted prices. As mentioned and illustrated in Figure 3(a),
each regular distribution Fi has a concave revenue-quantile curve. We define triangular instance
{TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 by letting vi
def
= p∗i and qi
def
= 1− Fi(p
∗
i ) for each i ∈ [n].
To see Part 1 of the lemma, by reusing the order σ∗ ∈ Π and posted prices {p∗i }
n
i=1 ∈ R
n
≥0,
the winning probability of each buyer i ∈ [n] remains the same. That is, this SPM mechanism
gives a revenue of SPM
(
σ∗, {p∗i }
n
i=1, {Fi}
n
i=1
)
= SPM
(
{Fi}
n
i=1
)
. This implies Part 1, since the
optimal SPM
(
{TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
)
mechanism at least generates the same revenue.
r(q)
q
0
ri(q)
1qi = 1− Fi(p∗i )
viqi = ri(qi)
(a) Revenue-quantile curves
Fi(p)
Fi(p)
p
vi = p
∗
i
1
0
1− qi = Fi(p
∗
i )
(b) CDF curves
Figure 3: Transformation from regular instance {Fi}
n
i=1 to triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1.
For brevity, denote by F i the CDF of triangular distribution TRI(vi, qi), and ri the revenue
quantile curve. We infer from Figure 3(b) that ri(q) ≤ ri(q) for all q ∈ [0, 1], i.e. F i(p) ≥ Fi(p)
for all p ∈ R≥0. Such stochastic domination directly indicates Part 2 (recall the AP(p) revenue
formula presented in Section 2.2), and thus completes the proof of Lemma 2.
To find the optimal solution to Program (P1), we safely restrict our attention to triangular
instances. For convenience, we re-index a triangular instance such that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn, and
still denote by Fi the CDF of each distribution TRI(vi, qi). Thus, the SPM revenue formula in
Part 1 of Lemma 1 is applicable. Further, we can formulate the AP revenue explicitly:
AP(p) = p ·
{
1−
∏
i:vi≥p
[ (1−qi)·p
(1−qi)·p+viqi
]}
≤ 1, ∀p ∈ R≥0,
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which converts into constraint (C2) after being rearranged. Therefore, the next mathematical
program admits the same optimal objective value as Program (P1). As mentioned before, the
new program has exactly the same set of constraints as in Alaei et al. (2019), but a different
objective function.
max
{TRI(vi,qi)}n
SPM =
∑n
i=1 viqi ·
∏i−1
j=1(1− qj) (P2)
subject to:
∑
i:vi≥p ln
(
1 + viqi1−qi ·
1
p
)
≤ − ln(1− p−1), ∀p ∈ (1,∞) (C2)
v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn
The following propositions further narrow down the optimal-solution space of Program (P2):
1. W.l.o.g. a worst-case instance satisfies the strict inequalities v1 > v2 > · · · > vn. Namely,
if two consecutive triangular distributions have the same vi = vi+1, we can replace them
(as a whole) with another triangular distribution, under which the SPM revenue remains
the same yet constraint (C2) still holds for all p ∈ (1,∞).
In Appendix C.2, we formalize this proposition as Lemma 10.
2. W.l.o.g. a worst-case instance includes a special distribution TRI(∞), whose CDF equals
F0(p) =
p
p+1 for all p ∈ R≥0. Hence, we can transform Program (P2) as follows:
(i) The objective function now becomes SPM = 1 +
∑n
i=1 viqi ·
∏i−1
j=1(1− qj).
(ii) Constraint (C2) becomes the following: for any p ∈ (1,∞),∑
i:vi≥p ln
(
1 + viqi1−qi ·
1
p
)
≤ − ln(1− p−1) + lnF0(p) = − ln(1− p−2).
In Appendix C.3, we formalize this proposition as Lemma 11; its proof relies on a reduc-
tion very similar to the one by Alaei et al. (2019, Lemma 4.2).
3. W.l.o.g. a worst-case instance includes a special distribution TRI(1, 1), i.e. a special buyer
with a deterministic value of 1. In particular, this buyer has no effect on constraint (C2),
and serves as the default winner in the SPM mechanism (when every other buyer has a
value of bi ≤ 1), hence a guaranteed SPM revenue of 1.
Given these, w.l.o.g. vn ≥ 1, and the objective function of Program (P2) now increases to
SPM = 2 +
∑n
i=1(vi − 1) · qi ·
∏i−1
j=1(1− qj).
For simplicity, we never explicitly mention the special distributions TRI(∞) and TRI(1, 1) else-
where. To summarize, the following mathematical program admits the same optimal solution
as Program (P1) and Program (P2).
max{
TRI(vi,qi)
}n SPM = 2 +∑ni=1(vi − 1) · qi ·∏i−1j=1(1− qj) (P3)
subject to:
∑
i:vi≥p ln
(
1 + viqi1−qi ·
1
p
)
≤ − ln(1− p−2), ∀p ∈ (1,∞) (C3.1)
v1 > v2 > · · · > vn ≥ 1
3.2 Upper-Bound Analysis II: Optimization
We continue to handle Program (P3) by following the proof framework of Alaei et al. (2019).
It is easy to check that ln
(
1 + x
p
)
≥ 1
p
· ln(1 + x) when p ≥ 1 and x ≥ 0. Applying this to the
LHS of constraint (C3.1) and then restricting ourselves to prices p ∈ {vk}
n
k=1, we are left with
constraints ∑k
i=1 ln
(
1 + viqi1−qi
)
≤ R(vk), ∀k ∈ [n], (C3.2)
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where R(p)
def
= −p · ln
(
1− p−2
)
. Although the constraint gets relaxed, later we will see that the
upper bound of C∗ = 2 +
∫ ∞
1
(
1− e−Q(x)
)
· dx ≈ 2.6202 still holds.
Recall the function Q(p) = − ln
(
1− p−2
)
− 12 ·
∑∞
k=1 k
−2 · p−2k from Theorem 1. The reader
may wonder how to relate constraint (C3.2) and the constant C∗, which involve two different
functions R(p) and Q(p). Actually, these two functions together satisfy the ODE in Part 1 of the
next Fact 1 (proved in Appendix C.4).
In what follows, we characterize a worst-case instance through its monopoly price {vi}
n
i=1
and quantile {qi}
n
i=1. Particularly, we will construct an interim instance, whose {qi}
n
i=1 satisfy
an R(p)-based recursive formula of {vi}
n
i=1 (see constraint (C3.3)). By contrast, the parameters
of our worst-case instance satisfy another Q(p)-based formula. It turns out that the worst-case
instance generates a better SPM revenue than the interim instance (see Lemma 4), for which
the proof crucially relies on Fact 1.
Fact 1. For functions R(p) = −p · ln(1 − p−2) and Q(p) = − ln(1 − p−2) − 12 ·
∑∞
k=1 k
−2 · p−2k,
the following holds:
1. R′(p) = p · Q′(p) < 0 for any p ∈ (1,∞).
2. lim
p→1+
R(p) = lim
p→1+
Q(p) =∞ and lim
p→∞R(p) = limp→∞Q(p) = 0.
With respect to the relaxed program with constraint (C3.2), the optimal solution turns out
to make constraint (C3.2) tight for every k ∈ [n]. This is formalized as Lemma 3, whose proof
is very similar to that of Alaei et al. (2019, Lemma 4.4) and is deferred to Appendix C.4.
Lemma 3. Given any triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 with constraint (C3.2) loose for some
i ∈ [n], there exists another triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 satisfying the following:
1. Constraint (C3.2) still holds, and is tight for each i ∈ [n].
2. SPM
(
{TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
)
≥ SPM
(
{TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
)
.
For ease of notation, let v0
def
= ∞. Based on Part 1 of Lemma 3 and Part 2 of Fact 1 (namely
R(v0) = 0), we get a recursive formula from constraint (C3.2): w.l.o.g. a worst-case instance
{TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 satisfies ln
(
1 + vkqk1−qk
)
= R(vk)−R(vk−1), namely
qk =
eR(vk)−R(vk−1) − 1
vk + eR(vk)−R(vk−1) − 1
, ∀k ∈ [n]. (C3.3)
Based on this recursive formula, we prove the following lemma in Appendix C.5.
Lemma 4. Given any triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 such that v1 > v2 > · · · > vn ≥ 1 and
the parameters {qi}
n
i=1 satisfying constraint (C3.3). The following holds for each k ∈ [n]:
(vk − 1) · qk ·
∏k−1
j=1(1− qj) ≤
∫
vk−1
vk
(x− 1) ·
(
−Q′(x)
)
· e−Q(x) · dx
≡
∫
vk−1
vk
(x− 1) · de−Q(x).
Roughly speaking, in Lemma 4 we replace the triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 by a spec-
trum of “small” triangular distributions (denoted by I for ease of notation). That is, this spec-
trum contains infinitely many buyers, but each specific buyer accepts his SPM offer with negligi-
ble probability. Below, we interpret Lemma 4 via the revenue-equivalence theorem of (Myerson,
1981), and safely interchange “SPM revenue” and “virtual welfare”.
With respect to {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1, the virtual welfareWTRI is a discrete random variable. Con-
cretely, we have WTRI = vk iff the index-k buyer accepts his take-it-or-leave-it offer but all the
10
smaller-index buyers refute their offers.7 This event occurs with probability qk ·
∏k−1
j=1(1 − qj).
But recall Section 3.1 that the special distribution TRI(1, 1) has a deterministic value of 1, and
we have already incorporated this one unit into the SPM revenue. Thereby, in expectation the
remaining virtual welfare E
[
(WTRI − 1)+
]
from {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 is exactly the telescoping sum
(over all k ∈ [n]) of the LHS formulas in Lemma 4:
E
[
(WTRI − 1)+
]
=
∑n
k=1(vk − 1) · qk ·
∏k−1
j=1(1− qj).
Respecting the spectral instance I, the virtual welfare WI is almost a continuous random
variable. Particularly, unlike WTRI that is supported on {v1, v2, · · · , vn}, WI can take any value
between [vn,∞) ≡
⋃n
k=1[vk, vk−1).
8 In this range, we must work with probability density rather
than probability mass: WI turns out to follow the CDF
Pr{WI ≤ x} = e−Q(x),
for any x ∈ [vn,∞). We have Pr{vn ≤ WI < ∞} = 1− e−Q(vn) because Q(∞) = 0 (see Part 2
of Fact 1). The remaining probability mass of e−Q(vn) is at WI = 1, as the special distribution
TRI(1, 1) has a deterministic value of 1. Again, the expected virtual welfare E
[
(WI − 1)+
]
from
the spectral instance I is exactly the telescoping sum of the RHS formulas in Lemma 4:
E
[
(WI − 1)+
]
=
∫ ∞
vn
(x− 1) · de−Q(x).
The lemma shows that the spectral instance I gives a higher SPM revenue than the trian-
gular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1. As a result, w.l.o.g. the worst-case of our mathematical program
contains a continuum of “small” buyers. Formally, by applying Lemma 4 for all k ∈ [n], we settle
the upper-bound part of Theorem 1 as follows:
SPM
(P3)
= 2 +
∑n
i=1(vi − 1) · qi ·
∏i−1
j=1(1− qj)
≤ 2 +
∫ ∞
vn
(x− 1) ·
(
−Q′(x)
)
· e−Q(x) · dx (by Lemma 4)
≤ 2 +
∫ ∞
1
(x− 1) ·
(
−Q′(x)
)
· e−Q(x) · dx (as vn ≥ 1)
= 2 +
∫ ∞
1
(
1− e−Q(x)
)
· dx = C∗ ≈ 2.6202. (integration by parts)
3.3 Lower-Bound Analysis
In this part, we consider the triangular instance defined in the following Example 1, which gives
a ratio of SPM to AP arbitrarily close to constant C∗ = 2+
∫ ∞
1
(
1− e−Q(x)
)
·dx ≈ 2.6202. Recall
that a triangular distribution TRI(vi, qi) has a CDF of Fi(p) =
(1−qi)·p
(1−qi)·p+viqi when p ∈ [0, vi), and
Fi(p) = 1 when p ∈ [vi,∞).
Example 1. Given any constant ε ∈ (0, 1) and integer n ≥ 2, let a
def
= min
{
(1+ ε),Q−1(ln ε−1)
}
,
b
def
= (1 + ε−1), δ def= b−a
n−1 , and v0
def
=∞. Define triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 as follows:
vi
def
= b− (i− 1) · δ, qi
def
=
R(vi)−R(vi−1)
vi +R(vi)−R(vi−1)
, ∀i ∈ [n].
Actually, the above parameters a and b are carefully chosen to guarantee the next technical
lemma (proved in Appendix C.6), which will be useful for our lower-bound analysis.
7At the monopoly price vk, the distribution TRI(vk, qk) has a probability mass of qk. Thus, when the index-k buyer
has a value of vk, his virtual value also equals vk.
8In fact, we may also have WTRI = 1, which occurs when only the special distribution TRI(1, 1) accepts the offer.
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Lemma 5. Given any constant ε ∈ (0, 1), let a = min
{
(1 + ε),Q−1(ln ε−1)
}
and b = (1 + ε−1).
Then, 2 +
∫
b
a
(x− 1) ·
(
−Q′(x)
)
· e−Q(x) · dx ≥ C∗ − 4 · ε.
Notice that (a) ln(1 + x) ≤ x when x ≥ 0; (b) function R is a decreasing function;
and (c) R(v0) = R(∞) = 0. Because Program (P3) is derived from Program (P1) via reductions,
it suffices to reason about Program (P3). We first show that triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
satisfies constraint (C3.1):
LHS of (C3.1) =
∑
i:vi≥p ln
(
1 + viqi1−qi ·
1
p
)
≤
∑
i:vi≥p
viqi
1−qi ·
1
p
(by Claim (a) above)
= p−1 · R(min
i∈[n]
{vi | vi ≥ p})− p
−1 · R(0) (by formulas of {qi}ni=1)
≤ p−1 · R(p) = RHS of (C3.1). (by Claims (b,c) above)
We next investigate the SPM revenue extracted from triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1, which
can be summarized as the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Consider the triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 defined in Example 1. It follows that
SPM ≥ C∗ − 6 · ε, for any sufficiently large integer n ∈ N+.
Proof. Note that (a) R(v0) = R(∞) = 0; (b) a = vn < vn−1 < · · · < v1 = b is a uniform
partition of interval [a, b], with norm δ = b−a
n−1 ; (c) R
′(p) = p · Q′(p) for any p ∈ (1,∞);
and (d) ln(1 + x) ≤ x when x ≥ 0. By the definition of Riemann integral, we have:
− lim
n→∞
∑i
j=1 ln(1− qi) = limn→∞
∑i
j=1 ln
(
1 +
R(vj)−R(vj−1)
vj
)
(by formulas of {qi}
n
i=1)
= ln
(
1 + R(v1)
v1
)
+
∫
v1
vi
(
− R
′(x)
x
)
· dx (by Claims (a, b) above)
= ln
(
1 + R(b)
b
)
−Q(b) +Q(vi) (by Claim (c); as v1 = b)
≤ R(b)
b
−Q(b) +Q(vi) (by Claim (d) above)
≤ − ln(1− b−2) +Q(vi), (as R(b) = −b · ln(1− b−2))
for each i ∈ [n]. By construction, we also have viqi1−qi = R(vi)−R(vi−1), for each i ∈ [n]. Based
on the objective function of Program (P3), we obtain an SPM-revenue sequence, with the limit
inferior of
lim
n→∞
SPM
(
{TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
)
= 2 + lim
n→∞
∑n
i=1
(vi−1)·qi
1−qi ·
∏i
j=1(1− qj)
(by construction and the arguments above)
≥ 2 + (1− b−2) · lim
n→∞
∑n
i=1(1− v
−1
i ) ·
(
R(vi)−R(vi−1)
)
· e−Q(vj)
(drop the summand with index i = 1)
≥ 2 + (1− b−2) · lim
n→∞
∑n
i=2(1− v
−1
i ) ·
(
R(vi)−R(vi−1)
)
· e−Q(vj)
(by Claims (b,c) above; as v1 = b and vn = a)
≥ 2 + (1− b−2) ·
∫
b
a
(x− 1) ·
(
−Q′(x)
)
· e−Q(x) · dx
(by applying Lemma 5)
≥ C∗ − (1− b−2) · 4 · ε− (C∗ − 2) · b−2
(as b = (1 + ε−1) and C∗ ≈ 2.6202 < 3)
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≥ C∗ − 5 · ε
Since ε ∈ (0, 1) is a given constant, SPM
(
{TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
)
≥ C∗ − 6 · ε, for any sufficiently large
integer n ∈ N≥1. Hence, Lemma 6 and the lower-bound part (in asymmetric regular setting) of
Theorem 2 are settled.
4 Anonymous Reserve vs. Anonymous Pricing
In this section, we study the revenue gap between AR and AP. Sorting the buyers’ values
b = {bi}
n
i=1 such that b(1) ≥ b(2) ≥ · · · ≥ b(n), we begin with formulating CDF D1 of the highest
value b(1) and CDF D2 of the second highest value b(2). For CDF D1, we have
D1(p) = Pr
{
b(1) ≤ p
}
= Pr
{
∀i ∈ [n] : bi ≤ p
}
=
n∏
i=1
Pr
{
bi ≤ p
}
=
n∏
i=1
Fi(p).
For CDF D2, the event that “the second highest value b(2) is at most p”, i.e.
{
b(2) ≤ p}, can be
partitioned into the following (n + 1) disjoint sub-events: Ai
def
=
{
(bi > p) ∧ (∀j 6= i : bj ≤ p)
}
for each i ∈ [n], and A0
def
=
{
∀i ∈ [n] : bi ≤ p
}
. Therefore,
D2(p) = Pr{A0}+
n∑
i=1
Pr{Ai} = D1(p)+
n∑
i=1
(
1−Fi(p)
)
·
∏
j 6=i
Fj(p) = D1(p)·
[
1+
n∑
i=1
( 1
Fi(p)
−1
)]
.
By definition, we have that AP(p) = p ·
(
1 −D1(p)
)
. In addition, an explicit formula of the AR
revenue is established in the following lemma (first introduced by Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2015).
For the sake of completeness, we provide a proof here. In Section 5, this lemma will also be
useful for the lower-bound analysis of the OPT vs. AR problem.
Lemma 7 (Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2015)). For any reserve price p ∈ R≥0, the Anonymous Reserve
revenue equals AR(p) = p ·
(
1−D1(p)
)
+
∫ ∞
p
(
1−D2(x)
)
· dx.
Proof. Given any reserve price p ∈ R≥0, there are three possible outcomes: (a) a revenue of 0
when no value reaches the reserve price of p, i.e. event
{
b(1) < p
}
; (b) a revenue of p when
exactly one value reaches the reserve price of p, i.e. event
{
b(1) ≥ p > b(2)
}
; and (c) a revenue
of b(2) when two or more values reach the reserve price of p, i.e. event
{
b(2) ≥ p
}
. Given these,
we can formulate the AR revenue as follows:
AR(p) = Eb∼F
[
p · 1
{
b(1) ≥ p > b(2)
}
+ b(2) · 1
{
b(2) ≥ p
}]
= Eb∼F
[
p · 1
{
b(1) ≥ p
}
+
(
b(2) − p
)
· 1
{
b(2) ≥ p
}]
= p ·
(
1−D1(p)
)
+
∫ ∞
p
(x− p) · dD2(x)
= p ·
(
1−D1(p)
)
+
∫ ∞
p
(
1−D2(x)
)
· dx. (integration by parts)
This completes the proof of Lemma 7.
Given the above revenue formulas, the revenue gap between AR and AP can be captured by
the next mathematical program. By finding the optimal solution, we attain the next theorem.
max
{Fi}ni=1,p∈R≥0
AR(p) = p ·
(
1−D1(p)
)
+
∫ ∞
p
(
1−D2(x)
)
· dx (P4)
subject to: AP(x) = x ·
(
1−D1(x)
)
≤ 1, ∀x ∈ R≥0 (C4)
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Theorem 2. The supremum ratio of AR to AP is equal to pi
2
6 ≈ 1.6449, which holds in each of
(a) asymmetric general setting, (b) asymmetric regular setting, and (c) i.i.d. general setting.
Proof Overview. In Section 4.1, we settle the upper-bound part of Theorem 2 in asymmetric
general setting, which implies the same upper bound in the other two settings. Then, we respec-
tively construct a matching i.i.d. general instance in Section 4.2, and a matching asymmetric
regular instance in Section 4.3. As a whole, Theorem 2 is accomplished.
Intuitively, we obtain Theorem 2 as follows. Recall Program (P1) in Section 3 for the SPM
vs. AP problem. The worst-case instance of Program (P1) actually makes constraint (C1) tight
everywhere, and thus in some sense “dominates” any other feasible instance. We simply “guess”
that Program (P4) possesses the same characterization, which turns out to be workable.
4.1 Upper-Bound Analysis
Due to constraint (C4), D1(p) ≥ Ψ1(p)
def
= (1− p−1)+, for all p ∈ R≥0. Namely, the highest-value
distribution D1 is stochastically dominated by distribution Ψ1. Moreover,
D2(p) = D1(p) ·
[
1 +
∑n
i=1
(
1
Fi(p)
− 1
)]
≥ D1(p) ·
[
1 +
∑n
i=1 ln
(
1
Fi(p)
)]
(as x ≥ ln(1 + x) when x ≥ 0)
= D1(p) ·
(
1− lnD1(p)
)
,
It can be seen that function d(x)
def
= x · (1 − lnx) is an increasing function on interval x ∈ (0, 1],
and that lim
x→0+
d(x) = 0. Hence, D2(p) ≥ d
(
Ψ1(p)
)
= Ψ2(p) for all p ∈ R≥0, where Ψ2(p)
def
= 0
when p ∈ [0, 1], and Ψ2(p)
def
= (1− p−1) ·
[
1− ln(1− p−1)
]
when p ∈ (1,∞).
For any reserve price p ∈ R≥0, the above arguments imply that
AR(p) ≤ p ·
(
1−Ψ1(p)
)
+
∫ ∞
p
(
1−Ψ2(x)
)
· dx. (1)
[When p ≤ 1]: RHS of (1) = p+
∫ 1
p
1 · dx+
∫ ∞
1
(
1−Ψ2(x)
)
· dx = 1 +
∫ ∞
1
(
1−Ψ2(x)
)
· dx.
[When p > 1]: RHS of (1) = 1 +
∫ ∞
p
(
1−Ψ2(x)
)
· dx < 1 +
∫ ∞
1
(
1−Ψ2(x)
)
· dx.
Combining both cases together results in the upper-bound part of Theorem 2:
AR = max
p∈R≥0
{
AR(p)
}
≤ 1 +
∫ ∞
1
(
1−Ψ2(x)
)
· dx
= 1 +
∫ ∞
1
[
1
x
− (1− 1
x
) ·
∑∞
k=1
1
k·xk
]
· dx (as ln(1− z) =
∑∞
k=1
zk
k
)
= 1 +
∑∞
k=1
1
k·(k+1) ·
∫ ∞
1
dx
xk+1
= 1 +
∑∞
k=1
1
k2·(k+1) =
∑∞
k=1
1
k2
= pi
2
6 . (2)
4.2 Lower-Bound Analysis in I.I.D. General Setting
We begin our lower-bound analysis of Theorem 2 with a matching i.i.d. general instance, namely
all of the buyers follow the same (possibly) irregular value distribution. For the instance {Fn}
n
defined in the following Example 2, we will prove that: (a) it is feasible to Program (P4),
for any n ∈ N≥1; (b) given any constant ε ∈ (0, 1), an AR revenue of at least
(
pi2
6 − ε
)
can
be extracted from it, whenever integer n ∈ N≥1 is sufficiently large. For simplicity, we reuse
notations defined in Section 4.1.
Example 2. There are n ∈ N+ buyers drawing i.i.d. values b = {bi}
n
i=1 from a common dis-
tribution Fn(p)
def
= n
√
Ψ1(p), i.e. Fn(p) = 0 when p ∈ [0, 1], and Fn(p) = (1 − p
−1)
1
n when
p ∈ (1,∞).
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First, AP(p) = p ·
[
1 −
(
Fn(p)
)n]
= p ·
(
1 − Ψ1(p)
)
≤ 1 for all p ∈ R≥0, and thus instance
{Fn}
n is feasible to Program (P4). For CDF D2 of the second highest value,
lim
n→∞D2(p) = limn→∞
(
Fn(p)
)n
·
[
1 + n ·
(
1
Fn(p)
− 1
)]
=
(
1− 1
p
)
·
{
1 + lim
n→∞
exp[− ln(1− 1
p
)·n−1]−1
n−1
}
= Ψ2(p),
for all p ∈ (1,∞). By choosing a fixed reserve price of 1, we obtain a convergent AR-revenue
sequence, with the limitation of
lim
n→∞AR
(
1, {Fn}
n
)
= 1 +
∫ ∞
1
(
1−Ψ2(x)
)
· dx
(2)
= pi2/6.
In that ε ∈ (0, 1) is a given constant, AR
(
1, {Fn}
n
)
≥ pi
2
6 − ε whenever integer n ∈ N≥1 is
sufficiently large. This settles the lower-bound part of Theorem 2 in i.i.d. irregular setting. (We
will prove in Appendix D that distribution Fn is indeed irregular, whenever n ≥ 2.)
Remark 2. Actually, because AP
(
p, {Fn}
n
)
= 1 for all p ∈ (1,∞), distribution Fn stochastically
dominates any other feasible distribution of Program (P4). This implies that instance {Fn}
n is
a worst-case instance of Program (P4), for any specific positive integer n ∈ N≥1. Below, we
provide the tight ratios corresponding to some small positive integer n ∈ N≥1.
n 2 3 4 · · · ∞
ratio 2 ln 2 ≈ 1.3863 3 ln 3− pi√
3
≈ 1.4820 9 ln 2− 3pi2 ≈ 1.5259 · · ·
pi2
6 ≈ 1.6449
4.3 Lower-Bound Analysis in Asymmetric Regular Setting
We next use triangular distributions to construct an asymmetric regular instance that matches
the bound in Theorem 2 as well. Actually, the idea behind this instance is very similar to that
behind Example 1 (i.e. the lower-bound instance of the SPM vs. AP problem in Section 3). For
convenience, we reuse notations defined in Section 4.1. Recall that a triangular distribution
TRI(vi, qi) has a CDF of Fi(p) =
(1−qi)·p
(1−qi)·p+viqi when p ∈ [0, vi), and Fi(p) = 1 when p ∈ [vi,∞).
Example 3. Given any constant ε ∈ (0, 1) and integer n ∈ N≥1, let a
def
= (1 + ε), b
def
= (1 + ε−1),
and δ
def
= b−a
n
. Based on function V(p)
def
= p·ln
(
p
p−1
)
, consider triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
2n
i=1:
vi
def
= b, qi
def
=
1
n
· V(vi)
vi +
1
n
· V(vi)
, ∀i ∈ [n];
vi
def
= b− (i− n) · δ, qi
def
=
V(vi)− V(vi−1)
vi + V(vi)− V(vi−1)
, ∀i ∈ [n+ 1 : 2n].
For ease of notation, let v0
def
= ∞. It can be checked that (a) ln(1 + x) ≤ x when x ≥ 0;
and (b) function V is a decreasing function. To justify the feasibility that AP
(
p, {TRI(vi, qi)}
2n
i=1
)
=
p ·
(
1−
∏2n
i=1 Fi(p)
)
≤ 1, or equivalently,
∑2n
i=1 lnFi(p) ≥ ln
(
1− 1
p
)
, we observe that
∑2n
i=1 lnFi(p) = −
∑
i:vi≥p ln
(
1 + viqi1−qi ·
1
p
)
≥ −
∑
i:vi≥p
viqi
1−qi ·
1
p
(by Claim (a) above)
= −1
p
· V
(
mini∈[2n]
{
vi | vi ≥ p
})
(by formulas of {qi}
2n
i=1)
≥ −1
p
· V(p) = ln
(
1− 1
p
)
. (by Claim (b) above)
Let us measure the AR revenue from the above triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
2n
i=1.
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Lemma 8. Consider the triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
2n
i=1 defined in Example 3. It follows that
AR ≥ AR(a) ≥ pi
2
6 − 3 · ε, for any sufficiently large integer n ∈ N+.
Proof. We first prove that lim
n→∞D1(p) = Ψ1(p) for any p ∈ [a, b]. Observe that (a) when n→∞,
qi → 0
+ for all i ∈ [2n]; and (b) a = v2n < v2n−1 < · · · < vn+1 < vn = b is a uniform partition
of interval [a, b], with norm δ = b−a
n
. As a result, for any p ∈ [a, b],
lim
n→∞D1(p) = exp
[
− limn→∞
∑
i:vi≥p ln
(
1 + viqi1−qi ·
1
p
)]
= exp
(
− limn→∞
∑
i:vi≥p
viqi
1−qi ·
1
p
)
(by Claim (a) that qi → 0
+)
= exp
(
− p−1 · V( min
i∈[2n]
{vi | vi ≥ p})
)
(by formulas of {qi}
2n
i=1)
= exp
(
− p−1 · V(p)
)
= 1− p−1. (by Claim (b) that norm δ → 0+)
Similarly, it can be checked that lim
n→∞D2(p) = Ψ2(p) for any p ∈ [a, b]. Because ε ∈ (0, 1) is a
given constant, by choosing a fixed reserve price of a = (1 + ε) and a sufficiently large integer
n ∈ N≥1, we capture an AR revenue of
AR(a) ≥ a ·
(
1−Ψ1(a)
)
+
∫
b
a
(
1−Ψ2(x)
)
· dx− ε
(2)
= pi2/6−
(∫ a
1
+
∫ ∞
b
)(
1−Ψ2(x)
)
· dx− ε.
It can be checked that ln
(
1 − 1
p
)
≤ −1
p
, and thus Ψ2(p) =
(
1 − 1
p
)
·
[
1 − ln
(
1 − 1
p
)]
≥ 1 − 1
p2
.
Recall that a = (1 + ε) and b = (1 + ε−1), then
(∫ a
1
+
∫ ∞
b
)(
1−Ψ2(x)
)
· dx ≤
(∫ a
1
+
∫ ∞
b
)
dx
x2
= 1− 1
a
+ 1
b
= 2·ε1+ε ≤ 2 · ε.
Combining the above two inequalities together completes the proof of Lemma 8. This settles
the lower-bound part of Theorem 2 in asymmetric regular setting.
5 Myerson Auction vs. Anonymous Reserve
For the OPT vs. AR problem in asymmetric regular setting, Hartline and Roughgarden (2009)
conjectured that the following two-buyer instance (i.e. Example 4) is the worst case. This
instance gives a ratio of 2, which remained the best known lower bound for a decade. Nonethe-
less, we will employ triangular instances to establish improved lower bounds.
Example 4. Consider a two-buyer instance: (a) one buyer draws his value from the equal-rev-
enue distribution F (p) = 1− 1
p
; and (b) the other buyer has a deterministic value of 1.
It can be checked that AR = AP = 1, whereas OPT = SPM = 2 (e.g. by sequentially posting
a price of∞ to the first buyer, and then posting a price of 1 to the second buyer).
The following lemma (see Appendix E for its proof) will be helpful in reasoning about our
sharper lower-bound instances. For this, we provide some intuitions in Remark 3, based on the
revenue-equivalence theorem of Myerson (1981).
Lemma 9. Given any triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 that v1 ≥ v2 · · · ≥ vn > vn+1
def
= 0, the
best AR revenue is achieved by reserve price p = vi, for some i ∈ [n].
Remark 3. Any triangular distribution TRI(vi, qi) is supported on interval p ∈ [0, vi], and only
the maximum possible value of bi = vi corresponds to a non-negative virtual value. Given any
k ∈ [n], when the seller raises the reserve price in AR mechanism from some p ∈ (vk+1, vk)
16
to p = vk, the item no longer gets allocated when the highest value is between (vk+1, vk). As
a result, the seller rules out some possible outcomes in AR mechanism that result in negative
virtual welfare. By the revenue-equivalence theorem, the new reserve price of p = vi leads to a
larger AR revenue.
Theorem 3. For the OPT vs. AR problem, there is a three-buyer instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
2
i=0 giving a
ratio of 2.1361, and a four-buyer triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
3
i=0 giving a ratio of 2.1596.
Proof. Our three-buyer instance contains three triangular distributions {TRI(vi, qi)}
2
i=0, where
the monopoly prices v0 > v1 > v2. Recall that a triangular distribution TRI(vi, qi) has a CDF of
Fi(p) =
(1−qi)·p
(1−qi)·p+viqi when p ∈ [0, vi), and Fi(p) = 1 when p ∈ [vi,∞). We reuse notations D1
and D2 to respectively denote the CDF’s of the highest and the second highest values.
• Let distribution TRI(v0, q0) be the special distribution TRI(∞) with CDF F0(p) =
p
p+1 .
Thus, AR(p) = p·
(
1−F0(p)
)
= p
p+1 , for all p ∈ (v1,∞); particularly, AR(v0) = AR(∞) = 1.
• Let v1 ∈ (1,∞) be a variable to be determined, and let q1
def
= 1/v21 .
Because this buyer always has a value no more than v1, the AR revenue under reserve
price p = v1 is equal to the AP revenue under posted price p = v1. Because q1 = 1/v
2
1 , we
conclude that AR(v1) = AP(v1) = v1 ·
[
1− v1
v1+1
· (1−q1)·v1(1−q1)·v1+v1q1
]
= 1.
• Let v2 be the root of equation v2 +
v1
1+v1−v21
· ln
[
1+v1
1+v2
·
v2(v21−1)+v1
v31
]
= 1, and let q2
def
= 1.
This buyer has a deterministic value of v2, i.e. AP(v2) = v2. For any x ∈ (v2, v1],
1−D2(x) =
(
1− F0(x)
)
·
(
1− F1(x)
)
=
v1q1
(x+ 1) ·
(
x+ v1q11−q1
) ,
Given these, and due to the definitions of q1 and v2, we have
AR(v2) = AP(v2) +
∫
v1
v2
(
1−D2(x)
)
· dx
= v2 +
v1
1 + v1 − v21
· ln
[ x+ 1
(v21 − 1) · x+ v1
]∣∣∣v1
v2
= 1.
Combining everything together, we conclude from Lemma 9 that AR = 1. On the other hand,
OPT = 1 + v1q1 + v2q2 · (1− q1) (by Lemma 1)
= 1 + 1/v1 + v2 · (1− 1/v
2
1). (as q1 = 1/v
2
1)
As Figure 4 shows, choosing v1 ≈ 1.5699 results in v2 ≈ 0.8399 and OPT ≈ 2.1361.
v2
v10.80
0.90
1.00
1.0 2.0 3.0
0.8399
1.5699
(a) v2-v1 curve
OPT
v12.0
2.05
2.10
2.15
1.0 2.0 3.0
2.1361
1.5699
(b) OPT-v1 curve
1
0.4057
0.6370
0.8399
ri(q)
q
10
(c) Revenue-quantile curves
Figure 4: Demonstration for the three-buyer instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
2
i=0 defined in Theorem 3.
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Similarly, the four-buyer instance is constructed as follows. The buyers’ value distributions
are triangular distributions whose parameters are specified in the next table. Based on Lem-
mas 1 and 9 and an analysis similar to the three-buyer instance, we numerically calculate the
revenue of AR and OPT. Details are omitted.
TRI(v0, q0) = TRI(∞) TRI(v1, q1) = TRI(1.8512, 0.2918)
TRI(v2, q2) = TRI(0.9700, 0.6138) TRI(v3, q3) = TRI(0.7231, 1.0000)
• AR(vi) ≈ 1.0000 for each i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, and thus AR ≈ 1.0000.
• OPT = 1 +
∑3
i=1 viqi ·
∏i−1
j=1(1− qj) ≈ 2.1596.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Remark 4. The reader may ask that why triangular instances are “bad cases” of the Myerson
Auction vs. Anonymous Reserve problem. Actually, the following reasoning guides us to obtain
the improved lower-bound instances involved in Theorem 3.
As mentioned, in comparison with Anonymous Pricing: (a) Sequential Posted-Pricing lever-
ages the price discrimination; (b) Anonymous Reserve employs the buyer competition; and (c) My-
erson Auction benefits from the both advantages.
In addition, for any triangular instance: (a) Lemma 1 suggests that Sequential Posted-Pricing
gives exactly the same revenue as Myerson Auction; that is, (b) the price discrimination plays a
dominant role in revenue maximization, whereas the buyer competition is negligible; (c) given
this, we conjecture that the worst case of the Myerson Auction vs. Anonymous Reserve problem
is reached by a triangular instance.
6 Conclusions
This work studies revenue gaps among OPT, SPM, AR, and AP. In the literature, there is
another simple mechanism receiving particular attention: Order-Oblivious Posted-Pricing (OPM)
proposed by Chawla et al. (2010). Roughly speaking, OPM is the worst-order (a.k.a. adversary)
counterpart of SPM, and models the fact that the seller cannot control the order of buyers in
some markets. In particular, this mechanism and the corresponding revenue are given by
OPM(F)
def
= min
σ∈Π
max
p∈Rn
≥0
{
SPM(σ,p,F)
}
.
The next three tables summarize current progress in this research agenda. For each comparison,
an interval indicates both of lower bound and upper bound, while a number means that this
bound is tight. Recall the lattice structure in Figure 1: SPM and OPM are identical for i.i.d.
distributions, and are both incomparable to AR.
Notice that some tight ratios in Table 1 and Table 2 are still unknown. It is an interesting
direction to close these gaps, which are beneficial to our understandings of relative powers and
distinctions of these mechanisms.
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Setting Comparison Ratio Reference
I.I.D. OPT vs. SPM⋄ α Kertz (1986); Correa et al. (2017)
OPT vs. SPM [α, β] Kertz (1986); Correa et al. (2019a)
Asym. OPT vs. OPM
2
Folklore, e.g. see Hartline (2013, Chapter 4.2.2)
SPM vs. OPM Hartline and Roughgarden (2009, Example 5.2)
(⋄): Note that SPM and OPM are equivalent in the i.i.d. setting.
Table 1: Summary I of revenue gaps; each comparison here admits the same ratio for general
distributions as for regular distributions, due to the ironing technique (see Myerson, 1981); for
definitions of constants α ≈ 1.34 and β ≈ 1.49, recall Footnotes 4 and 5, respectively.
Setting Comparison Ratio Reference
I.I.D. Regular
OPT vs. AP
e/(e− 1)
Chawla et al. (2010)
SPM⋄ vs. AP Du¨tting et al. (2016)
OPT vs. AR [2.1596, C∗] Theorem 3, Alaei et al. (2019)
OPT vs. AP C∗ Alaei et al. (2019); Jin et al. (2019a)
Asym. Regular SPM vs. AP C∗ Theorem 1
OPM vs. AP [e/(e− 1), C∗] Theorem 1, Du¨tting et al. (2016)
AR vs. AP pi2/6 Theorem 2
(⋄): Note that SPM and OPM are equivalent in the i.i.d. setting.
Table 2: Summary II of revenue gaps.
Setting Comparison Ratio Reference
OPT vs. AR Chawla et al. (2010)
I.I.D. General
OPT vs. AP 2 Hartline (2013)
SPM⋄ vs. AP Du¨tting et al. (2016)
AR vs. AP pi2/6 Theorem 2
OPT vs. AR
OPT vs. AP
n Alaei et al. (2019)
Asym. General SPM vs. AP
OPM vs. AP
AR vs. AP pi2/6 Theorem 2
(⋄): Note that SPM and OPM are equivalent in the i.i.d. setting.
Table 3: Summary III of revenue gaps; note that all ratios here are well understood.
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A Mathematical Facts
A.1 Proof of Fact 1
Fact 1. For functions R(p) = −p · ln(1 − p−2) and Q(p) = − ln(1 − p−2) − 12 ·
∑∞
k=1 k
−2 · p−2k,
the following holds:
1. R′(p) = p · Q′(p) < 0 for any p ∈ (1,∞).
2. lim
p→1+
R(p) = lim
p→1+
Q(p) =∞ and lim
p→∞R(p) = limp→∞Q(p) = 0.
Proof. To see Fact 1, we note that (a) ln(1 − z) = −
∑n
k=1 k
−1 · zk; (b)
∑∞
k=1 k
−2 = pi
2
6 ;
and (c) ln(1 + x) ≤ x when x ≥ 0. Given these, for Part 1 of the lemma:
R(p)
(a)
=
n∑
k=1
k−1 · p−(2k−1) > 0 ⇒ R′(p) = −
n∑
k=1
(2− k−1) · p−2k < 0; (3)
Q(p)
(a)
=
n∑
k=1
(
k−1 −
k−2
2
)
· p−2k > 0 ⇒ Q′(p) = −
n∑
k=1
(2− k−1) · p−(2k+1) (3)=
R′(p)
p
. (4)
For the first chain of equalities in Part 2:
lim
p→1+
R(p) ≥ − ln(1− lim
p→1+
p−2) =∞;
lim
p→1+
Q(p) ≥ − ln(1− lim
p→1+
p−2)−
1
2
·
∞∑
k=1
k−2
(b)
= ∞−
pi2
12
=∞.
For the second chain of equalities in Part 2:
0
(3)
≤ lim
p→∞R(p) = limp→∞ p · ln
(
1 +
1
p2 − 1
) (c)
≤ lim
p→∞
p
p2 − 1
= 0;
0
(4)
≤ lim
p→∞Q(p) ≤ − ln(1− limp→∞ p
−2) = 0.
This completes the proof of Fact 1.
A.2 Proof of Fact 2
Fact 2. G(x, y) ≤ 0 for any y ≥ x > 1, where
G(x, y)
def
= (1− x−1) · (eR(x)−R(y) − 1) +
(
R(y)−R(x)
)
−
(
Q(y)−Q(x)
)
.
Proof. SinceG(x, x) ≡ 0, it suffices to prove that ∂G
∂y
≤ 0 when y ≥ x > 1. To this end, (a) recall
Part 1 of Fact 1 that R′(p) = p · Q′(p) < 0; and (b) define g(x) def= ln(1 − x−1)− x · ln(1− x−2).
Then,
∂G
∂y
= −(1− x−1) · eR(x)−R(y) · R′(y) +R′(y)−Q′(y)
(a)
=
(
−R′(y)
)
· e−R(y) ·
[
(1− x−1) · eR(x) − (1− y−1) · eR(y)
]
(b)
=
(
−R′(y)
)
· e−R(y) · (eg(x) − eg(y)).
Since ln(1− z) ≤ −z for any z ∈ (0, 1), we observe that
g′(x) = − ln(1− x−2)− x−1 · (x+ 1)−1 ≥ x−2 − x−1 · (x+ 1)−1 ≥ 0,
which implies that ∂G
∂y
≤ 0 when y ≥ x > 1. This completes the proof of Fact 2.
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A.3 Proof of Fact 3
Fact 3. H(x, y) ≥ 0 for any y ≥ x > 1, where
H(x, y)
def
= x−1 · (eR(x)−R(y) − 1)− (eQ(x)−Q(y) − 1).
Proof. SinceH(x, x) ≡ 0, it suffices to prove that ∂H
∂y
≥ 0when y ≥ x > 1. To this end, (a) recall
Proof 1 of Fact 1 that R′(p) = p · Q′(p) < 0; and (b) define h(x) def= x · eQ(x)−R(x). Then,
∂H
∂y
= x−1 · eR(x)−R(y) ·
(
−R′(y)
)
− eQ(x)−Q(y) ·
(
−Q′(y)
)
(a)
= x−1 · eR(x)−Q(y) ·
(
−Q′(y)
)
· (y · eQ(y)−R(y) − x · eQ(x)−R(x))
(b)
= x−1 · eR(x)−Q(y) ·
(
−Q′(y)
)
·
(
h(y)− h(x)
)
We observe that, for any x ≥ 1,
h′(x) = eQ(x)−R(x) ·
(
1 + x · Q′(x)− x · R′(x)
)
(a)
= eQ(x)−R(x) ·
[
1 + (x− 1) ·
(
−R′(x)
)]
≥ 0.
which implies that ∂H
∂y
≥ 0 when y ≥ x > 1. This completes the proof of Fact 3.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. For any triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn, it follows that:
1. OPT = SPM =
∑n
i=1 viqi ·
∏i−1
j=1(1− qj).
2. An optimal SPM lets the buyers come in lexicographic order, and posts price pi = vi to each
buyer i ∈ [n].
Proof. For convenience, we assume that parameters {vi}
n
i=1 are all finite. (Otherwise, we can
slightly modify the proof via a standard argument from measure theory.) Any triangular distri-
bution TRI(vi, qi) is supported on interval p ∈ [0, vi], and has a CDF of Fi(p) =
(1−qi)·p
(1−qi)·p+viqi when
p ∈ [0, vi), and Fi(p) = 1 when p ∈ [vi,∞). Thus, any value p ∈ (0, vi) corresponds to a virtual
value of ϕi(p) = p−
1−Fi(p)
fi(p)
= − viqi1−qi , and value p = vi corresponds to a virtual value of vi.
Φi
p
0−viqi/(1− qi) vi
(vi, 1− qi)
1
Figure 5: Demonstration for virtual value CDF Φi of triangular distribution TRI(vi, qi).
As Figure 5 demonstrates, the resulting virtual value CDF Φi is given by
Φi(p) = (1− qi) · 1
{
p ≥ −viqi/(1− qi)
}
+ qi · 1
{
p ≥ vi
}
, ∀p ∈ R,
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So, for any non-negative virtual value p ∈ R≥0 the product CDF Φ(p)
def
=
∏n
i=1Φi(p) equals
Φ(p) =
∏
i:vi>p
(1− qi).
Let vn+1
def
= 0 for notational brevity. By the revenue-equivalence theorem (see Myerson, 1981),
Myerson Auction gives a revenue of
OPT = Eb∼F
[
maxi∈[n]
(
ϕi(bi)
)
+
]
=
∫ ∞
0
(
1− Φ(x)
)
· dx
=
n∑
i=1
[
1−
i∏
j=1
(1− qj)
]
· (vi − vi+1) =
n∑
i=1
viqi ·
i−1∏
j=1
(1− qj).
We then prove that the Sequential Posted-Pricing proposed in Part 2 of Lemma 1 actually extracts
the same revenue. This follows from the next two observations: when each buyer k ∈ [n] comes,
• The item remains unsold with a probability of
∏k−1
j=1(1− qj).
• If so, buyer k purchases the item at the posted price of pk = vk with a probability of qk.
In that this Sequential Posted-Pricing generates the same revenue as Myerson Auction, its opti-
mality trivially holds. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
C Missing Proofs in Section 3
C.1 Numeric Calculation about Constant C∗ ≈ 2.6202
Define function F(z)
def
= z−2− (z−2 − 1) · e
1
2
·∑∞k=1 k−2·z2k on interval z ∈ (0, 1). Recall Theorem 1
for function Q and constant C∗. Applying integration by substitution (i.e. z = x−1), we have
C∗ = 2 +
∫ ∞
1
(
1− e−Q(x)
)
· dx = 2 +
∫ 1
0
F(z) · dz.
To make things mimic, we demonstrate the both integrands in the following figure; it is easy to
infer from Figure 6(b) that the integral is finite.
y
p
1
0
1 2 3 4 5
(a) function y = e−Q(p)
y
z
1
1
2
0
1
(b) function y = F(z)
Figure 6: Demonstration for numeric calculations about constant C∗ ≈ 2.6202.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 10
Lemma 10. W.l.o.g. any worst-case instance of Program (P2) satisfies that v1 > v2 > · · · > vn.
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Proof. W.l.o.g. suppose that vk = vk+1 for some k ∈ [n − 1], then consider the following new
triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n−1
i=1 :
vi
def
= vi, qi
def
= qi, ∀i ∈ [k − 1];
vk
def
= vk = vk+1, qk
def
= qk + qk+1 − qk · qk+1; (5)
vi
def
= vi+1, qi
def
= qi+1, ∀i ∈ [k + 1 : n− 1].
To establish Lemma 10, it suffices to prove the following:
• SPM
(
{TRI(vi, qi)}
n−1
i=1
)
= SPM
(
{TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
)
;
• AP
(
p, {TRI(vi, qi)}
n−1
i=1
)
≤ AP
(
p, {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
)
for any p ∈ R≥0.
Recall the SPM revenue formula in Lemma 1. The first claim trivially holds by construction, i.e.
vkqk
(5)
= vkqk + vk+1qk+1 · (1− qk) and 1− qk
(5)
= (1− qk) · (1− qk+1). For the second claim, recall
the AP(p) revenue formula in Section 2.2. It suffices to justify that F k(p) ≥ Fk(p) · Fk+1(p).
This follows as F k(p) = Fk(p) = Fk+1(p) = 1 when p ∈ [vk,∞), and
(
F k(p)
)−1
−
(
Fk(p) · Fk+1(p)
)−1
= 1 +
vkqk
1− qk
·
1
p
−
(
1 +
vkqk
1− qk
·
1
p
)
·
(
1 +
vk+1qk+1
1− qk+1
·
1
p
)
(5)
= −
qk
1− qk
·
qk+1
1− qk+1
·
(vk
p
− 1
)
·
vk
p
≤ 0,
when p ∈ (0, vk). This completes the proof of Lemma 10.
C.3 Proof of Lemma 11
Lemma 11. W.l.o.g. any worst-case instance of Program (P2) includes distribution TRI(∞), i.e.
CDF F0(p) =
p
p+1 for all p ∈ R≥0.
Proof. Given a triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 feasible to Program (P2), assume w.l.o.g. that∑n
i=1 viqi ≥
∑n
i=1 viqi ·
∏i−1
j=1(1− qj) = SPM > 1, then (a) k
def
= argmin1≤i≤n
{∑i
j=1 vjqj > 1
}
is
well defined. Besides, (b) vkqk ≤ 1, which follows from constraint (C2) as
1 ≥ AP(vk) = vk ·
(
1−
n∏
j=1
Fi(vk)
)
≥ vk ·
(
1− Fk(vk)
)
= vkqk.
Now, consider the next triangular instance TRI(vi, qi)
n−k+1
i=1 :
v1
def
= vk, q1
def
=
1
vk
·
( k∑
i=1
viqi − 1
) (a)
≤ qk; (6)
vi
def
= vi+k−1, qi
def
= qi+k−1, ∀i ∈ [2 : n− k + 1]. (7)
We can infer Lemma 11 from the following:
• SPM
(
{TRI(∞) ∪ TRI(vi, qi)}
n−k+1
i=1
)
≤ SPM
(
{TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
)
.
• AP
(
p, TRI(∞) ∪ {TRI(vi, qi)}
n−k+1
i=1
)
≤ 1 for any p ∈ R≥0.
Recall the SPM revenue formula in Lemma 1. The firts claim trivially holds by construction, i.e.
1 + vkqk
(6)
=
∑k
i=1 viqi ≥
∑k
i=1 viqi ·
∏i−1
j=1(1− qj) and 1− q1
(6)
≥ 1− qk ≥
∏k
i=1(1− qk).
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To see the second claim, recall the AP(p) revenue formula in Section 2.2. As formalized in
Program (P2), v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn. By construction, v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn−k+1, and thus
AP
(
p, TRI(∞) ∪ {TRI(vi, qi)}
n−k+1
i=1
)
≤ AP
(
p, TRI(∞)
)
= p ·
(
1−
p
p+ 1
)
=
p
p+ 1
≤ 1,
for any p ∈ [v1,∞). In the other range of p ∈ (0, v1) = (0, vk), we only need to reveal that
AP
(
p, TRI(∞)∪{TRI(vi, qi)}
n−k+1
i=1
)
≤ AP
(
p, {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
)
, which is implied by the following:
(
F 0(p) · F 1(p)
)−1
=
(
1 +
1
p
)
·
(
1 +
∑k
i=1 viqi − 1
1− qk
·
1
p
)
(6)
≤
(
1 +
1
p
)
·
(
1 +
∑k
i=1 viqi − 1
1− qk
·
1
p
)
(as qk ≤ qk)
(a,b)
≤
(
1 +
1
p
)
·
(
1 +
∑k
i=1 viqi − 1
1− qk
·
1
p
)
+
(1− vkqk) · (1−
∑k−1
i=1 viqi)
p2 · (1− qk)
=
(
1 +
∑k−1
i=1 viqi
p
)
·
(
1 +
vkqk
1− qk
·
1
p
)
≤
k∏
i=1
(
1 +
viqi
1− qi
·
1
p
)
=
k∏
i=1
(
Fi(p)
)−1
,
where the last inequality follows as 1 +
∑
i zi ≤
∏
i(1 + zi) when zi’s are all non-negative. This
completes the proof of Lemma 11.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3. Given any triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 with constraint (C3.2) loose for some
i ∈ [n], there exists another triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 satisfying the following:
1. Constraint (C3.2) still holds, and is tight for each i ∈ [n].
2. SPM
(
{TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
)
≥ SPM
(
{TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
)
.
Proof. Let v0
def
= ∞; recall Part 2 of Fact 1 that R(v0) = 0. W.l.o.g. let k ∈ [n] be the smallest
index for constraint (C3.2) to be loose, then
i∑
j=1
ln
(
1 +
vjqj
1− qj
)
= R(vi) ⇒ ln
(
1 +
vjqj
1− qj
)
= R(vi)−R(vi−1), ∀i ∈ [k − 1];
k∑
j=1
ln
(
1 +
vjqj
1− qj
)
< R(vk) ⇒ ln
(
1 +
vkqk
1− qk
)
< R(vk)−R(vk−1). (8)
Denote ∆k
def
= ln
(
1 + vkqk1−qk
)
for brevity, and consider this triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1:
vi
def
= vi, qi
def
= qi, ∀i ∈ ([n] \ {k});
vk
def
= R−1
(
∆k +R(vk−1)
)
, qk
def
=
eR(vk)−R(vk−1) − 1
vk + eR(vk)−R(vk−1) − 1
. (9)
In what follows, we prove that (a) this instance makes constraint (C3.2) tight for each i ∈ [k];
and (b) SPM
(
{TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
)
≥ SPM
(
{TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1
)
. To see so, these facts are useful:
• vk < vk < vk−1, since R(vk)
(9)
= ∆k + R(vk−1)
(8)
∈
(
R(vk−1),R(vk)
)
and function R is a
decreasing function (see Part 1 of Fact 1);
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• ln
(
1 + viqi1−qi
)
= ln
(
1 + viqi1−qi
)
for each i ∈ [n], by construction of instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1;
• qk < qk and vkqk > vkqk, as a consequence of the first and second facts.
Clearly, Claim (a) follows from the first and second facts and Equation (9). Moreover, recall
Program (P3) for the SPM revenue formula. Here is a sufficient condition for Claim (b):
(vi − 1) · qi ·
i−1∏
j=1
(1− qj) ≥ (vi − 1) · qi ·
i−1∏
j=1
(1− qj), ∀i ∈ [n].
From the third fact and Equation (9), we know (vi− 1) · qi ≥ (vi− 1) · qi and 1− qj ≥ 1− qj for
all i ∈ [n]. Given these, the above inequality and thus Claim (b) follows immediately.
Respecting Claims (a, b), we can easily construct a desired triangular instance by induction.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
C.5 Proof of Lemma 4
We have proved Facts 2 and 3 respectively in Appendices A.2 and A.3. Both facts are useful for
proving Lemma 4.
Fact 2. G(x, y) ≤ 0 for any y ≥ x > 1, where
G(x, y)
def
= (1− x−1) · (eR(x)−R(y) − 1) +
(
R(y)−R(x)
)
−
(
Q(y)−Q(x)
)
.
Fact 3. H(x, y) ≥ 0 for any y ≥ x > 1, where
H(x, y)
def
= x−1 · (eR(x)−R(y) − 1)− (eQ(x)−Q(y) − 1).
Lemma 4. Given any triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 such that v1 > v2 > · · · > vn ≥ 1 and
the parameters {qi}
n
i=1 satisfying constraint (C3.3). The following holds for each k ∈ [n]:
(vk − 1) · qk ·
∏k−1
j=1(1− qj) ≤
∫
vk−1
vk
(x− 1) ·
(
−Q′(x)
)
· e−Q(x) · dx.
Proof. It suffices to justify the following two inequalities:
(vk − 1) · qk · (1− qk)
−1 ≤
∫
vk−1
vk
(x− 1) ·
(
−Q′(x)
)
· dx; (10)
k∏
j=1
(1− qj) ≤ e
−Q(x), ∀x ∈ [vk, vk−1]. (11)
To see inequality (10), recall Fact 2, constraint (C3.3) that qk =
e
R(vk)−R(vk−1)−1
vk+e
R(vk)−R(vk−1)−1 , and Part 1
of Fact 1 that R′(p) = p · Q′(p) for any p ∈ (1,∞). It follows that
LHS of (10)
(C3.3)
= (1− v−1k ) · (e
R(vk)−R(vk−1) − 1)
≤
(
R(vk)−R(vk−1)
)
−
(
Q(vk)−Q(vk−1)
)
(by Fact 2)
= RHS of (10). (by Part 1 of Fact 1)
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Similarly, to deal with inequality (10), recall Fact 1 that Q is a decreasing function on interval
p ∈ (1,∞), and that Q(v0) = Q(∞) = 0. Combining these arguments with Fact 3 results in
LHS of (11)
(C3.3)
=
k∏
j=1
[
1 + v−1j · (e
R(vj )−R(vj−1) − 1)
]−1
≤
k∏
j=1
(
eQ(vj )−Q(vj−1)
)−1
(by Fact 3)
= e−Q(vk) ≤ RHS of (11). (by Fact 1)
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
C.6 Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5. Given any constant ε ∈ (0, 1), let a = min
{
(1 + ε),Q−1(ln ε−1)
}
and b = (1 + ε−1).
Then, 2 +
∫
b
a
(x− 1) ·
(
−Q′(x)
)
· e−Q(x) · dx ≥ C∗ − 4 · ε.
Proof. By the definition of C∗ ≈ 2.6202, it suffices to justify the next two inequalities:∫
a
1
(x− 1) ·
(
−Q′(x)
)
· e−Q(x) · dx ≤ 2 · ε; (12)∫ ∞
b
(x− 1) ·
(
−Q′(x)
)
· e−Q(x) · dx ≤ 2 · ε. (13)
Observe that (a) function Q is a decreasing function on interval p ∈ (1,∞); (b) Q(1+) = ∞;
and (c) Q(p) = − ln(1− p−2)− 12 ·
∑∞
k=1 k
−2 · p−2k ≤ − ln(1− p−2). Given these, we have
LHS of (12) ≤
∫
a
1
x ·
(
−Q′(x)
)
· e−Q(x) · dx
=
∫
a
1
x · de−Q(x) (integration by parts)
≤ a · e−Q(a) (by Claims (a,b) above)
≤ (1 + ε) · ε ≤ RHS of (12); (as a = min
{
(1 + ε),Q−1(ln ε−1)
}
)
LHS of (13) =
∫ ∞
b
x ·
(
−Q′(x)
)
· e−Q(x) · dx
= b ·
(
1− e−Q(b)
)
+
∫ ∞
b
(
1− e−Q(x)
)
· dx (integration by parts)
≤ b · b−2 +
∫ ∞
b
x−2 · dx (by Claim (c) above)
= 2 · ε/(1 + ε) ≤ RHS of (13). (as b = 1 + ε−1)
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
D Proof of Lemma 12
Lemma 12. For any n ≥ 2, distribution Fn(p)
def
=
{
0 ∀p ∈ [0, 1](
1− 1
p
) 1
n ∀p ∈ (1,∞)
is irregular.
Proof. As mentioned, a distribution is regular iff its revenue-quantile curve is a concave func-
tion. Hence, it suffices to prove that the revenue-quantile curve rn(q)
def
= q1−(1−q)n =
1∑n−1
k=0 (1−q)k
of distribution Fn is a convex function on interval q ∈ (0, 1). In this range:
r′n(q) =
∑n−1
k=0 k · (1− q)
k−1[∑n−1
k=0(1− q)
k
]2 ;
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r′′n(q) =
2 ·
[∑n−1
k=0 k · (1− q)
k−1]2[∑n−1
k=0(1− q)
k
]3 −
[∑n−1
k=0 k · (k − 1) · (1− q)
k−1][∑n−1
k=0(1− q)
k
]2
≥
[∑n−1
k=0 k · (1− q)
k−1]2[∑n−1
k=0(1− q)
k
]3 −
[∑n−1
k=0 k
2 · (1− q)k−2
]
[∑n−1
k=0(1− q)
k
]2
≥ 0. (by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality)
This completes the proof of Lemma 12.
E Proof of Lemma 9
Lemma 9. Given any triangular instance {TRI(vi, qi)}
n
i=1 that v1 ≥ v2 · · · ≥ vn > vn+1
def
= 0, the
best AR revenue is achieved by reserve price p = vi, for some i ∈ [n].
Proof. Recall that a triangular distribution TRI(vi, qi) has a CDF of Fi(p) =
(1−qi)·p
(1−qi)·p+viqi when
p ∈ [0, vi), and Fi(p) = 1 when p ∈ [vi,∞). Hence, the virtual value function ϕi of triangular
distribution Fi maps any value p ∈ (0, vi) to a negative constant virtual value of
ϕi(p)
def
= p−
1− Fi(p)
fi(p)
= −
viqi
1− qi
. (14)
To see the lemma, it suffices to show that AR(p) is a non-decreasing function on each interval
p ∈ (vi+1, vi). Assume w.l.o.g. that this interval is non-empty, then
AR(p) = p ·
(
1−
∏i
j=1 Fj(p)
)
+
∫ ∞
p
{
1−
∏
j:vj≥x Fj(x) ·
[
1 +
∑
j:vj≥x
(
1
Fj(x)
− 1
)]}
· dx;
⇒ AR′(p) =
i∏
j=1
Fj(p) ·
i∑
j=1
fj(p)
Fj(p)
·
(
− ϕj(p)
) (14)
≥ 0.
This completes the proof of Lemma 9.
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